Purpose: This research studies the UAV incidents in the vicinity of worldwide airports in order to deliver a quantitative and qualitative analysis of this phaenomenon, to analyse the risks associated to this threat and propose mitigation measures that brings this risk to an 'acceptable' level. Design/methodology: A population of 139 'serious UAV incidents in the vicinity of worldwide airports' has been constituted on the basis of the FAA and NASA databases and articles published on the Web by online media. This phaenomenon has then been analysed quantitatively using descriptive statistics techniques and qualitatively by analysing in-depth some representative incidents. A risk analysis has then been performed based on the FAA Safety Risk Management 5-steps process to identify the hazards i.e. the root causes of those UAV incidents, determine their outcome i.e. negative consequences that jeopardize airports objectives and assign them a severity level and likelihood i.e. frequency level. Analysed risks have then been assessed based on FAA ARP Risk Matrix. Mitigation measures (prevention, deterrence, denial, detection, neutralisation) have been identified following a 'Defence-in-Depth' approach. Findings: The findings of the study are that those UAV incidents are more numerous than anticipated and happen higher and further from the airports than expected: they happen not only in CTRs but also in TMAs. This has an impact on the mitigation measures that shall not only be deployed at airports side but also be on-boarded in manned aircrafts. Originality/value: To our knowledge, no study has combined different sources to constitute such a population focused on 'serious' UAVs incidents around airports worldwide, has applied the official FAA Safety Risk Management process to assess this risk and followed a structured 'Defence-in-Depth' approach typically used in Cybersecurity to mitigate this risk.
Counter-UAVs technologies
reports the most notorious security incidents involving UAVs and states the problem faced by law enforcement and security agencies to combat the UAV threats: poor understanding of the issue due to the novelty of UAVs and lack of cohesive defense strategy. The study seeks to answer the 2 following research questions: How are UAVs used for illegal purposes or terrorism? and What are the current defense methods against UAV threats?. The study identifies and describes following UAV threats: nuisance to the general public, including individual's privacy violation, property trespassing and children and animals upsetting; aerial surveillance, including observation of young children and aerial reconnaissance to collect 'intelligence' information about the vulnerabilities in critical infrastructures, government sites, business and private citizens in order to prepare an attack against those 'targets'; airspace interference, including near-misses between UAVs and airliners and interruption of aerial emergency responses due to the presence of UAVs in the disaster area; Kinetic/Kamikaze threat materialized when UAVs accidently cause damages to people or properties, but could also be used 'out-ofthe-box' to purposely cause injuries and even fatalities due to their lethal potential; Payload threat/smuggling, including transportation of illegal contraband or cargo, bypassing security barriers and perimeters like the ones protecting a prison or a border. Weaponized threat consists in the construction and modification of UAVs to carry and employ different types of weapons, including non-lethal and lethal projectile weapons, Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) and Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) based on chemical, biological and radiological substances; Electronic threat, consisting in using a UAV to perpetrate a cyber-attack. The study presents the UAVs defense concepts, relying upon a 'defense-in-depth' approach organised into 5 concentric layers: prevention through actionable intelligence, including UAV components purchase monitoring; deterrence relying on new legislations to both fund agencies to acquire UAVs defense measures and to establish civil/criminal penalties to deter illegal UAVs use; denial through passive security measures that decrease the effectiveness of UAVs in conducting illegal activities or terrorism, including the selection of a right location that presents impediments to a UAV attack (e.g. indoor rather than outdoor venue) and 'geofencing' implemented by UAV manufacturers that prevents a 'out-of-the-box' UAV approaching critical infrastructures, including airports, based on its Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) position; detection of the UAVs, identification and tracking to prepare their neutralisation, including active detection with radars adapted to detect UAVs which present small cross-sections and radar software that distinguish them from birds and passive detection with visual, acoustic, thermal/infrared and RF communications monitoring systems, this latter allowing to detect the communication between the UAV and the radio-control unit of its pilot; interruption/destruction, including interception of the pilot, jamming UAV's control and/or GNSS signals to interrupt them, spoofing which consists in sending falsified GNSS navigation or control data, destruction with projectile weapons, directed energy weapons, guided munitions and interception with a Counter-UAVs UAV. 'Destructive' techniques are effective but can cause 'collateral damages' due to falling projectiles and debris of the hostile UAV with its dangerous payload. Michel (2018) provides a comprehensive market study that identifies 235 Counter-UAV products, already on the market or in active development, produced by 155 manufacturers in 33 countries. The Counter-UAV market has grown exponentially those last years, proportionally to the rise of concerns around the drones threat. The author mentions the usage of Counter-UAV systems: on the battlefield, they are deployed to protect military bases, mobile ground units and convoys; In civilian environments, they are used primarily for airspace protection at airports, securing large events, VIP protection and counter-smuggling operations at prisons. Future applications are protection of critical infrastructures (on top of airports) and private property protection. The study describes the main detection and tracking techniques implemented by those products: radars, radio-frequency scanners, electro-optical cameras, infrared cameras, acoustic sensors. The study notes that those techniques are usually combined to increase the effectiveness of the UAV detection system. Interdiction techniques are also described: radio-frequency jamming, GNSS jamming, control data spoofing, electromagnetic pulse, laser, nets, machine guns, water projectors, sacrificial collision drones and are also usually combined. Those detection and interdiction techniques are used alone or combined in systems that can be ground-based, hand-held or UAVbased i.e. carried by a Counter-UAVs UAV. RF and GNSS jamming is the most common interdiction technique. Relevant to our own study, it shall be noted that only one system combines ground-based and UAV-based elements and only 2 products are based on projectiles designated specifically for Counter-UAV. The report describes the challenges of Counter-UAV systems: detection effectiveness: UAVs are small, low altitude aircrafts which are hard to detect and can be confused with birds; false negatives and false positives: finding the right 'sensitiveness' setting is a real challenge; Distinguishing legitimate and illegitimate drone use: as legitimate UAVs use is becoming common in the civilian environments and on the battlefield, the Counter-UAV system should not shoot down a legitimate, 'allied' UAV. Interdiction hazards: kinetic interdiction techniques are risky due to the fall of the UAV or its debris on the ground and non-kinetic techniques can interfere with legitimate communications. Interdiction effectiveness: some large scale trials have demonstrated that UAVs are very resilient against damage and that most of current solutions need further improvements. The report also mentions the effectiveness limitations of non-kinetic techniques: RF jamming is useless if the UAV is programmed to operate autonomously such as GNSS jamming in the case the UAV can operate in GNSS denied environments, spoofing is very difficult to implement. Legality of interdiction: interdiction techniques like jamming and spoofing can be illegal. Lack of standards: There are no standards for the design and use of Counter-UAV systems, implying significant performance and reliability variances. The report also raises the concern that hostile UAVs might form a swarm, which is still more challenging to fight. The report also covers the approach of a Dutch firm: use (living) bird of preys to intercept rogue UAVs. Relevant to our study is the position of the FAA that 'advised airports against the use of jammers since they can interrupt air traffic management operations' and the electronic identification which allows to quickly spot the 'good' UAVs in the perimeter. Buric and De Cubber (2017) provide an inventory of the threats represented by malicious UAVs: violation of privacy; intelligence; weapons and ammunition transport; terrorist attacks using weapons, bombs, grenades, radioactive materials; intentional or unintentional collide with other authorized aircraft vehicles; using drones as projectiles (kamikaze drones); people injuring; propaganda; critical infrastructure properties and goods damage; transport of the illegal objects (smugglers); stopping or slowing commercial UAVs industry development. They describe the exploited vulnerabilities: Low cost of recreational and commercial UAVs; Weakness of the export control; Gaps into existing regulatory framework: for both using UAVs and Counter-UAV tools, this latter including the right to destroy a hostile UAV, the right to jam its radio-communication, the right to hack its computer program; Lack of the effective Counter-UAV technology, including the lack of common standards which could guide potential developers of such systems; Deployment challenges taking into account the variety of environments where malicious UAVs could be encountered and conditions of use: day, night, meteorological conditions; misunderstanding by the different decision levels of the real threat dimension i.e. decisions related to regulatory countermeasures are taken at different administrative and political levels; technological rapidly development that brings new features to UAVs and increase their resistance against countermeasures e.g. commercial UAVs flying without GNSS, artificial intelligence that allows them to operate in swarm collaborative mode; ISTAR capabilities for commercial and recreational UAVs i.e. Information, Surveillance, Target Acquisition and Reconnaissance which used to be limited to military UAVs; Commercial and recreational UAVs modified to get military features i.e. as the ones modified by ISIS in order to increase their lethality, their effectiveness and resistance to countermeasures; environments where malicious UAVs can be used i.e. in more and more busy RF spectrum and 'noisy' backgrounds making them more and more difficult to detect and classify. The study proposes an architecture for a Counter-UAV system and a 5 steps 'kill chain' model: detection: with active radar; passive radar i.e. use 'electro smog' generated by GSM or WIFI as a source of illumination; passive optics: video, thermal or infrared cameras; active optics i.e. LIDAR; acoustic sensors; RF emissions scanner; B-field detection i.e. exploiting disturbance of the magnetic field around a UAV and qualify their performance; A 3 steps classification process to be implemented by a data fusion algorithm: determine if detected object is a UAV; determine if it represents a threat; assess the risk level based on target type, direction of arrival, range, velocity, estimated time of arrival, number of hostile UAVs, number of sensors that have confirmed target, altitude, output from queried UAV traffic management database, size; Tracking of the threatening UAVs on a Geographic Information System (GIS) map with their ID; Neutralization whose method(s) are chosen according to the environment and its effects on target hostile UAVs among: geofencing, firearms, lasers, missiles, gun nets, counter-UAV UAVS, birds, jamming, high power electromagnetic weapon (electronic blast), hacking; Forensic whose goal is to establish the identity of the UAV owner, the purpose the UAV was used for, the flight path and the home point. The report also presents the SafeShore project whose objectives are to cover gaps in European coastal border surveillance and prevent cross-border crime such as trafficking in human beings and smuggling of drugs. It addresses the threats presented by small UAVs departing from maritime platforms such as yachts, boats and human intruders on the sea shore which cannot be detected by regular coastal radars. SafeShore innovative UAVs detection solution leverages a 3D LIDAR combined with passive acoustic sensors, passive radio frequency detection and cameras. Another goal of SafeShore is to perform fusion of information to increase the 'situational awareness' of actors in charge of the European coastal protection. Of interest to our study is the high-level requirements specification for a Counter-UAV system: should cover all steps of the 'kill chain' i.e. detection, classification, risk assessment, tracking, neutralisation, forensic; Detection should combine all types of state-of-the-art sensors; Neutralization should include alternative solutions 'engaged' according to results of data fusion and processing, risk assessment and validated by a human; Information should be gathered and analysed in the forensic phase to develop future preventive and reactive measures; Standard interfaces should be used to insure interconnection with Law Enforcement Agencies command and control rooms. It shall be noted that first SafeShore trials have taken place during second fortnight of May 2018 on the Belgian coast where the prototype developed by the project team has been benchmarked with 'off-the-shelf ' detection solutions already available on the market based on Doppler radar, electro-optic camera, infrared camera and acoustic sensor. At the moment of writing the present article, test results are being processed and compiled. In this coastal environment, the challenges are the 'noise' generated by the waves motion and the high number of birds flying which have to be distinguished from small UAVs. Gettinger and Michel (2015) also presents solutions that might reduce of prevent UAV incidents: geo-fencing like the one installed in the DJI and 3DR UAVs which maintains an up-to-date list of restricted airspaces; Senseand-avoid systems that allow a UAV to detect a potential collision with another aircraft and take evasive action; UAV Traffic Management (UTM) systems based on cellular networks.
UAV Incidents at Civilian Airports

Methodology
The goal was to constitute a population of worldwide UAV incidents to be in a position to perform a quantitative and qualitative analysis in order to draw the characteristics of the 'UAV incidents at civilian airports' phaenomenon.
A Google search has been initiated with the search keys: 'UAV incidents airports', 'drone incidents airports', 'UAV incidents aéroports', 'drone incidents aéroports'. Wikipedia (2018) has been spotted in the first page of the search result and the UAV incidents referred in the categories 'Alleged aircraft collisions' and 'Aircraft near-miss incidents' have been further analysed. The incidents having happened in the vicinity of civilian airports have been selected. Additional UAV airport incidents returned by the searches result, mostly reported by the online media, have also been studied.
Those selected UAV airport incidents have then been 'formatted' as per following criteria:
• Date.
• Airport.
• Incident Type.
• Source of information.
• Manned aircraft type involved.
• Number of UAVs involved.
• Flight phase.
• Altitude (feet).
• Distance between UAV and aircraft (feet).
• Distance from airport (KMs).
• Indicator if UAV was captured.
• Indicator if UAV pilot was identified.
• Effects of incidents. N.B. There is little info about the UAVs type involved in those incidents.
This search also allowed to identify Dan Gettinger and Arthur H. Michel (2015) which leverages the FAA (2018) and NASA (2018) UAV incidents databases. Those 2 databases have been exploited and Near Mid Air Collision (NMAC) incidents have been selected in our population. It must be noted that we retained only the incidents where the manned aircraft pilot(s) have explicitly declared a NMAC. A population of 139 UAV incidents in the vicinity (i.e. <35 kilometers) of worldwide civilian airports has been constituted and can be found in the Annex I.
The observation period is from May 2014 till May 2018. Following chart provides the distribution of those 139 UAVs incidents over their sources: Figure 1 . UAV incidents distributed per reporting sources (NASA & FAA, 2018) Following chart provides the distribution of those 139 UAVs incidents over the years of the observation period: 
Quantitative analysis
The population of 'UAV incidents in the vicinity of worldwide civilian airports' constituted in the scope of this study (Annex I) has been exploited to perform a statistical quantitative analysis of this phaenomenon and answer to a set of questions.
What type of UAV incidents?
Following chart provides the distribution of those 139 UAVs incidents over the types of incidents: Figure 3 . UAV incidents distributed per incident types (NASA & FAA, 2018) Following table provides a definition of the UAV incident types:
Incident Type Definition Near Mid Air Collision (NMAC)
FAA defines a Near Mid Air Collision (NMAC) as an incident associated with the operation of an aircraft in which a possibility of a collision occurs as a result of proximity of less than 500 feet to another aircraft, or a report is received from a pilot or flight crew member stating that a collision hazard existed between two or more aircraft. Mid Air Collision (MAC) SKYbrary (2018) defines a Mid Air Collision (MAC) as an accident where two aircrafts come into contact with each other while both are in flight. Airspace Closure Airspace closure, for an airport, is a period of time during which no aircraft is permitted to operate to and from that airport. Jetliner Sighting 'Jetliner Sighting', as per our definition, is the action of taking pictures and/or videos of an aircraft, typically a jetliner, during its landing or taking off phase with the camera embedded in a UAV. Those pictures and/or videos are later on posted on the social media. Airport indoor Sighting 'Airport indoor Sighting', as per our definition, is the action of taking pictures and/or videos with the camera embedded in a UAV flying inside an airport hall. 
Where did those UAV incidents occur and the most affected airports?
Following chart provides the distribution of the 139 UAVs incidents over the countries where they took place: Interpretation: United States authorities i.e. NASA and FAA maintain and publish UAV incidents databases, which are the main sources of our study, besides worldwide online media. This is thus normal that we have more cases reported in the U.S. United Kingdom has encountered many UAV incidents reported by the online media. The root cause of this proportionally high level of UAV incidents in U.K. is worth further investigating.
A 'hit parade' of the airports with the biggest UAV incidents frequency has been established from our population:
Airport
Number of UAV incidents Heathrow International Airport (GB) 9 Gatwick International Airport (GB) 3 London Stansted International Airport (GB) 1 TOTAL LONDON AIRPORTS 13 JFK New York International Airport (US) 2 La Guardia New York International Airport (US) 4 Liberty Newark International Airport (US) 2 TOTAL NEW-YORK AIRPORTS 8 Miami International Airport (US) Nombre 4 Logan Boston International Airport (US) 3 Los Angeles International Airport (US) 3 Dubai International Airport (AE) 3 Philadelphia International Airport (US) Nombre 3 Table 2 . Airports with highest UAV incidents frequency A 'hit parade' of the airports which have been the most impacted, in term of flights delayed, returned or diverted and the associated economic losses, has also been established from our population. Those airports have faced 'Airspace closure' incidents: Airport Number of airspace closures Dubai International Airport (AE) 3 Gatwick International Airport (GB) 2 Sharjah International Airport (AE) 1 Chengdu Shuangliu International Airport (CN) 1 Chongqing International Airport (CN) 1 Auckland International Airport (NZ)) 1 Table 3 . Airports the most impacted due to their airspace closure N.B. Liège has not been included in the table as it only 'suffered' from a partial closure of its airspace, the runway has not been affected.
What types of manned aircraft involved in UAV incidents?
Following chart provides the distribution of the 2 MAC, 124 NMAC and 2 jetliner sighting incidents over the types of involved manned aircrafts: Interpretation: All types of aircraft are affected by the phaenomenon.
How many UAVs involved in the incidents?
Following chart provides the distribution of the UAV incidents over the number of UAVs involved in the incident: 
UAVs incidents at take-off or landing phase?
Following chart provides the distribution of the 2 MAC, 124 NMAC and 2 jetliner sighting incidents over the incidents over the take-off and landing phases: Interpretation: The trajectory of a landing plane is different from the one of a taking off plane. A taking off plane reaches a higher height at a shorter distance from the runway.
At what height UAVs incidents happen?
Following chart provides the distribution of the UAV incidents over the height intervals at which they happened (when height was known): Following table provides some statistical indicators about the height of UAV incidents in our population and compare them with (Gettinger & Michel, 2015) : Important remark: It shall be noted that for some UAV incidents, the height was provided at Mean Sea Level (MSL, in which case the value represents an altitude), and in some cases Above Ground Level (AGL). Ideally for our study, all height values should have been expressed AGL. We have NOT made the correction taking into account the elevation of the airport. So for some cases, the value represented in term of MSL is higher than the equivalent AGL value and thus those incidents are presented 'higher' than they actually are.
At what distance was the UAV from the manned aircraft?
Following chart provides the distribution of the UAV incidents over the intervals of distance between the UAV and the manned aircraft (when such distance was known): Following table provides some statistical indicators about the distance between the UAV and the manned aircraft in our population and compare them with the ones found in the Bard college study (Gettinger & Michel, 2015) : 
At what distance was the UAV from the airport?
Following chart provides the distribution of the UAV incidents over the intervals of distance between the UAV and the airport (when such distance was known): Figure 10 . UAV incidents distributed over the distance from airport (NASA & FAA, 2018) Following table provides some statistical indicators about the distance between the UAV and the airport in our population and compare them with the ones found in the Bard college study (Gettinger & Michel, 2015) : Following chart shows the relation between the 'distance from airport' (X-axis) and 'height' (Y-axis) variables for our UAV incidents population (when such distances and heights were known): Figure 11 . Relation between airport distance and incident height (NASA & FAA, 2018) Interpretation: Distance from airport and height are linked by an increasing function: height of UAV incidents tend to increase as distance from airport increase. This could be linked to the trajectory of aircrafts around airports: they flight lower when closer to airports.
Have manned aircraft pilot taken evasive action?
Following chart shows the proportion of our UAV incidents where the manned aircraft pilot(s) have undertaken an evasive manoeuvre to avoid a collision with the UAV: Interpretation: In many cases, manned aircraft pilots report they had no time to take evasive action and only providence has helped in avoiding the collision with the UAV.
Have rogue pilot and/or UAV been captured?
Following chart shows the proportion of our UAV incidents where the rogue UAV pilot or UAV has been captured: Figure 13 . Proportion of UAV incidents with UAV captured (NASA & FAA, 2018) Interpretation: In 137 cases out of 139, neither the pilot nor the UAV could be identified by the forensic investigation that has been systematically launched after the incident. It shall be noted that for the 2 incidents where the pilot was intercepted, 1 incident happened inside the hall of an airport and for the other, a 'jetliner sighting', the pilot could be identified because he posted the video on a social media and he could be tracked back by IT forensic means. So, there is a total impunity for those who infringe UAV legislations worldwide as authorities are helpless in identifying the outlaw UAV pilots and UAV!!!
Qualitative Analysis
Near Mid Air Collision (NMAC)
Some NMACs extracted from the FAA database (2018) and NASA database (2018) While on short final for runway 31L at 1500 feet, a drone/UAV was headed straight for our aircraft at a bearing of 135 at a high rate of closure and barely missed us. My first officer was the first to spot what he first thought was a collection [of] balloons emerging from the runway 31L center line. As the object got closer we saw that the object was some sort of diamond-shaped drone with a single pusher prop behind it. The drone passed less than 50 feet directly over the nose of our aircraft where we got a good look at it. We reported the encounter to Tower. They tried, but could [not] successfully track the vehicle on radar. This drone incident was a great concern to me compared to the other encounters reported by aircraft this year for a variety of reasons. First, was the deliberate nature of the drone's operator in heading right for our aircraft down the center line of a major US airport runway in a difficult political climate. Next, was the type of drone used. This drone was not your typical four-rotor toy as in previous encounters. The four to five foot fixed-wing, diamond-shape, stealthy police/military style fuselage, with short, blended, delta wings and down sloping winglets, had a belly mounted camera globe. This was closely related to an upgraded 'Killer Bee (or Bat)' drone I once spotted during my time as an aviator in the military. Finally, I was concerned that ATC had no ability to track this larger UAV and find those responsible. We need more visual binocular scanning from tower, rather than relying on Airport Radar which doesn't seem to pick up drones of the size and type I encountered.
[Authorities] recommended to me that a pilot should hit the ident button on the transponder when you see a drone coming in close proximity to your aircraft. He said it helps ATC better pinpoint the location of these small vehicles (NASA -JFK Nov 2015 incident).
While flying the FYTTE4 RNAV STAR to ORD, we were on downwind leg for Rwy 27R, level at 4000 MSL and between the VULCN and HIMGO waypoints. I and the First Officer (FO) visually acquired a mostly stationary airborne object ahead of the aircraft and to the right side of our flight path. We quickly closed with the object and then the object passed off the right side of the aircraft at very close range. Although I had initially identified the object as looking like some drifting party-type balloons, as we passed the object the FO stated 'I think it's a drone'. While I never got a good enough look to be certain that the object was a small unmanned device, the FO was in a much better position to visually track the object so I trust his judgment on the matter. In addition, I noted that the object seemed to be very nearly motionless, which would be unusual for balloons, which are generally ascending at low altitudes such as this one. After passing the object, the FO reported the presence of a possible drone just south of our course at present position. The entire event happened so quickly that as the Flying Pilot I didn't take any evasive action, since it appeared that we would miss the object narrowly off our right-hand side. The cause of the event would appear to be someone's reckless decision to intentionally or mistakenly operate a small unmanned device in close proximity to air traffic executing arrival procedures to ORD. Education of small UAV operators is paramount to ensure that folks know that a small unmanned device can pose a significant safety hazard for even such a significantly larger aircraft such as a jet airliner. In addition, I'm certain that the technology exists to detect even small unmanned devices and alert the pilots of larger aircraft to their presence. That technology would be hugely helpful in preventing drone strikes and near misses (NASA -Chicago Oct 2017 Incident).
Mid Air Collision (MAC)
Aviation Safety Network Database (2018) The New York Times (2017) reports that a UAV crashed into a passenger aircraft, a Beech King Air A100 (multipropellers airliner), at his landing at Jean Lesage International Airport in Quebec city. The incident took place in September 2017. The drone was flying at 1500 feet, five times as high of what is permitted in Canada, and came from the left as the plane approached the runway. This was the first occurrence of a collision between a UAV and a commercial aircraft in Canada. The aircraft landed safely and suffered from minor damages: scratches on the wing. The UAV could not be located neither his pilot identified. Remark: numerous UK online media reported a collision between a UAV and a British Airways Airbus A320 jetliner during its approach to Heathrow London airport in April 2016. The forensic investigation found no evidence of a UAV collision and mentioned that the suspect object could have been a plastic bag.
3.3.3. Airspace closure NATS2 (2017) provides a very interesting video about the 2nd July 2017 Gatwick UAV incident.
It shows howthe spotting of a UAV flying on the approach path to Gatwick airport evolves over the following hours and impacts on air traffic:
• Airport authorities decide to suspend arrivals and direct aircrafts to Timba and Willo hold zones.
• Once the 2 hold zones have been filled up, arriving aircrafts were diverted to other airports due to fuel considerations and a contingency hold was activated.
• Then after checking the drone had disappeared, the runway was reopened for arrivals…
• And shortly after, the drone was spotted again and arrivals were suspended again.
• More aircrafts were diverted to other airports while the Solent 'en-route' hold was activated to retain traffic at higher altitudes to spare fuel.
• Runway was re-opened after further inspection verified that the drone had definitively gone away.
• Disruptions it caused on the air traffic lasted till end of the day, with returning aircrafts delayed at departure airports. Figure 15 . Air traffic Perturbation due to UAV at Gatwick (NATS2, 2017)
Airport indoor sighting
South China Morning Post3 (2017) reports a man has been arrested after flying a UAV in the restricted departure area at the Honk Kong International Airport.
He flew the UAV inside the hall of the airport and took pictures while awaiting a flight to Tokyo. Hethen posted the pictures on social media, which triggered a forensic investigation by the airport police who identified him. He was intercepted by the police at the Honk Kong International Airport when he returned from Tokyo. The UAV was found in his bag. He violated the Airport Authority Bylaw on flight safety and carries a maximum penalty of six months in jail and a 50 000 HK$ fine. 
Jetliner sighting
Risk Analysis and Mitigation
Methodology
We have followed the Safety Risk Management (SRM) 5-Steps process described in Neubauer et al. (2015) .
Describe the system
We have followed the 5M Model to describe the system.
Mission
In the scope of our study, we will consider that the missions of a civilian airport i.e. its objectives are: 1. To insure the safety of passengers, personnel of companies hosted at the airport including airlines and own personnel within the physical perimeter of the airport.
2. To protect assets of passengers, of companies hosted at airport including aircrafts and own assets within the physical perimeter of the airport. 3. To insure the safety of passengers and crew on-board aircrafts during their taking-off and landing phases at the airport, within the airspace under its control i.e. equivalent of Terminal Radar Approach CONtrol (TRACON) in U.S. which usually handles traffic in a 30 to 50 Nautical Miles (56 to 93 KMs) range from the airport. 4. To protect aircrafts assets during their taking-off and landing phases at the airport within the airspace under its control. 5. To maximize the passengers' user experience inside the perimeter of the airport and on-board the aircrafts taking off and landing at the airport.
Identify hazards, analyse and assess the risks
Identify hazards
Kenneth Neubauer et al. (2015) defines a hazard as acondition that is a precondition to an accident or incident.
First column of Table VIIIidentifies hazards as the precondition to the UAV incidents in our population (APPENDIX A).
Analyse the risks
The risk analysis consists in anticipating the potential outcomes from the identified hazards: Third column of Table VIII and assign them a severity: Fourth column of Table VIII and a likelihood: Fifth column of Table  VIII .
In reference to K. Neubauer et al. (2015) , definition of severity levels havebeen originated from FAA ARP 5200.11. and definition of likelihood have been originated from FAA ARP internal order 5200.11. It shall be noted that in our study, the probability is assessed for one single airport and not for the community of all the airports in the world!
Assess the risks
Risk has been assessed based on FAA ARP Risk Matrix (Order 5200.11 change 2) found in K. Neubauer et al. (2015) : 
Mitigate the risks
We have followed the 'defense-in-depth' approach described in Wallace (2015) to identify the measures that mitigates the analysed risks and more specifically the extremely improbable but catastrophic scenario where a UAV pilot flies too high in the vicinity of the airport and/or too close of the runway without authorizations from ATC which results in a Mid Air Collision with an aircraft causing it so severe damages that it gets lost with fatalities among passenger:
Defence in Depth Layer (Wallace, 2015) Mitigation Operate Counter-UAV helidrones that catches the illegal UAVs in the airports vicinity with a net. This helidrone will start as an RPAS before becoming autonomous when it will have learned from the expertise of its human pilots and from its missions.
Authorities
-UAV legislation is enforced as illegal UAVs operating in the vicinity of airports are captured and can be tracked back to their pilot/owner. -Collateral damages are minimized (no projectiles, no spoofing/jamming signals emissions that could interfere with airports equipment) 
Conclusions and Future Works
The effort to carry on this study has been larger than expected due to the bigger than expected number of 'serious' UAV incidents encountered at the vicinity of worldwide airports. This shows that this phaenomenon is worth being considered and addressed by the worldwide civil airport and aviation authorities and associated risks should be mitigated.
We hope that the report will help them to better seize and understand the phaenomenon and initiate appropriate actions at national and international levels. Except for U.S., where the FAA and NASA maintain and publish UAV incidents databases, national and international civil aviation organisations worldwide, like EASA, do not publish UAV incidents (do they even maintain such databases?). Such UAV incidents database are very good sources for analysing such phaenomenon and its evolution over the years. You cannot control what you can't measure!
The findings of the study, compared to what was anticipated when initiated, is that those UAV incidents are more numerous and happen higher and further from the airports than expected: They happen not only in CTRs but also in TMAs. This has of course an impact on the mitigation measures: they shall not only be deployed at airports side but also be on-boarded in manned aircrafts! The study could not determine an important point: Who are those illegal UAV pilots and what are their motivations? This because the illegal UAVs cannot be intercepted so far and tracked back to their pilot/owner.
Future works will be pursued:
• Risk analysis and assessment of UAV hazards that have not yet (fortunately!) materialized: terrorist attack lead or facilitated with UAVs against airports and stationary, landing and taking-off aircrafts, cyber-attacks facilitated by UAVs as part of 'hybrid wars' in highly instable geo-political contexts…
• Maintain the UAV incidents database and expand it as such incidents become published by more national and international civil aviation authorities worldwide.
• Share the study with the national and international UAVs, airports and civil aviation authorities and communities to inform them and collect their feedback to make the study evolve.
• Share the study with the Counter-UAV industry so that they can develop products and services that address this risk appropriately, effectively and efficiently and that respond to worldwide airport and civil aviation authorities needs and requirements.
• Leverage the study in the scope of own PhD whose subject is the certification (DO178C/DO278) of 'intelligent' algorithms embedded in UAVs and integrated in air traffic control ground systems. Those algorithms are aimed to be implemented in the detection and neutralisation systems mentioned in the present article:
• Detect-and-avoid systems embedded in UAVs to avoid collision with manned aircrafts and other UAVs.
• Detect-and-avoid systems embedded in aircrafts to avoid collision with UAVs.
• Detection systems deployed at airports to detect UAVs in their CTR.
• Autonomous Counter-UAV helidrones that can intercept illegal UAVs and catch them with a net.
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Appendix A: Population of UAV incidents around civilian airports
